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Abstract. Propositional logics in general, considered as a set of sen-
tences, can be undecidable even if they have “nice” representations,
e.g., are given by a calculus. Even decidable propositional logics can be
computationally complex (e.g., already intuitionistic logic is PSPACE-
complete). On the other hand, finite-valued logics are computationally
relatively simple—at worst NP. Moreover, finite-valued semantics are
simple, and general methods for theorem proving exist. This raises the
question to what extent and under what circumstances propositional
logics represented in various ways can be approximated by finite-valued
logics. It is shown that the minimal m-valued logic for which a given
calculus is strongly sound can be calculated. It is also investigated under
which conditions propositional logics can be characterized as the inter-
section of (effectively given) sequences of finite-valued logics.
1 Introduction
The question of what to do when faced with a new logical calculus is an old
problem of mathematical logic. Often, at least at first, no semantics are available.
For example, intuitionistic propositional logic was constructed by Heyting only as
a calculus; semantics for it were proposed much later. Linear logic was in a similar
situation in the early 1990s. The lack of semantical methods makes it difficult
to answer questions such as: Are statements of a certain form (un)derivable?
Are the axioms independent? Is the calculus consistent? For logics closed under
substitution, many-valued methods have often proved valuable since they were
first used for proving underivabilities by Bernays [5] in 1926 (and later by others,
e.g., McKinsey and Wajsberg; see also [17, § 25]). The method is very simple.
Suppose you find a many-valued logic in which the axioms of a given calculus are
tautologies, the rules are sound, but the formula in question is not a tautology:
then the formula cannot be derivable.
⋆ Research supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of
Canada.
Example 1. Intuitionistic propositional logic is axiomatized by the following cal-
culus IPC:
1. Axioms:
a1 A ⊃ A ∧ A
a2 A ∧B ⊃ B ∧ A
a3 (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ∧ C ⊃ B ∧ C)
a4 (A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ C) ⊃ (A ⊃ C)
a5 B ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
a6 A ∧ (A ⊃ B) ⊃ B
a7 A ⊃ A ∨B
a8 A ∨B ⊃ B ∨ A
a9 (A ⊃ C) ∧ (B ⊃ C) ⊃ (A ∨B ⊃ C)
a10 ¬A ⊃ (A ⊃ B)
a11 (A ⊃ B) ∧ (A ⊃ ¬B) ⊃ ¬A
a12 A ⊃ (B ⊃ A ∧B)
2. Rules (in usual notation):
A A ⊃ B
B
MP
Now consider the two-valued logic with classical truth tables, except that ¬
maps both truth values to “true”. Then every axiom except a10 is a tautology
and modus ponens preserves truth. Hence a10 is independent of the other axioms.
To use this method to answer underivability question in general it is necessary
to find many-valued matrices for which the given calculus is sound. It is also
necessary, of course, that the matrix has as few tautologies as possible in order
to be useful. We are interested in how far this method can be automatized.
Such “optimal” approximations of a given calculus may also have applica-
tions in computer science. In the field of artificial intelligence many new (propo-
sitional) logics have been introduced. They are usually better suited to model the
problems dealt with in AI than traditional (classical, intuitionistic, or modal)
logics, but many have two significant drawbacks: First, they are either given
solely semantically or solely by a calculus. For practical purposes, a proof the-
ory is necessary; otherwise computer representation of and automated search
for proofs/truths in these logics is not feasible. Although satisfiability in many-
valued propositional logics is (as in classical logic) NP-complete [16], this is still
(probably) much better than many other important logics.
On the other hand, it is evident from the work of Carnielli [6] and Ha¨hnle [12]
on tableaux, and Rousseau, Takahashi, and Baaz et al. [2] on sequents, that
finite-valued logics are, from the perspective of proof and model theory, very
close to classical logic. Therefore, many-valued logic is a very suitable candidate
if one looks for approximations, in some sense, of given complex logics.
What is needed are methods for obtaining finite-valued approximations of
the propositional logics at hand. It turns out, however, that a shift of emphasis
is in order here. While it is the logic we are actually interested in, we always
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are given only a representation of the logic. Hence, we have to concentrate on
approximations of the representation, and not of the logic per se.
What is a representation of a logic? The first type of representation that
comes to mind is a calculus. Hilbert-type calculi are the simplest conceptually
and the oldest historically. We will investigate the relationship between such cal-
culi on the one hand and many-valued logics or effectively enumerated sequences
of many-valued logics on the other hand. The latter notion has received consider-
able attention in the literature in the form of the following two problems: Given
a calculus C,
1. find a minimal (finite) matrix for whichC is sound (relevant for non-derivabil-
ity and independence proofs), and
2. find a sequence of finite-valued logics, preferably effectively enumerable,
whose intersection equals the theorems of C, and its converse, given a se-
quence of finite-valued logics, find a calculus for its intersection (exempli-
fied by Jas´kowski’s sequence for intuitionistic propositional calculus, and by
Dummett’s extension axiomatizing the intersection of the sequence of Go¨del
logics, respectively).
For (1), of course, the best case would be a finite-valued logicM whose tautolo-
gies coincide with the theorems of C. C then provides an axiomatization of M.
This of course is not always possible, at least for finite-valued logics. Lindenbaum
[15, Satz 3] has shown that any logic (in our sense, a set of formulas closed under
substitution) can be characterized by an infinite-valued logic. For a discussion
of related questions see also Rescher [17, § 24].
In the following we study these questions in a general setting. Consider a
propositional Hilbert-type calculus C. It is (weakly) sound for a given m-valued
logic if all its theorems are tautologies. Unfortunately, it turns out that it is
undecidable if a calculus is sound for a givenm-valued logic. However, for natural
stronger soundness conditions this question is decidable; a finite-valued logic for
which C satisfies such soundness conditions is called a cover for C. The optimal
(i.e., minimal under set inclusion of the tautologies)m-valued cover for C can be
computed. The next question is, can we find an approximating sequence of m-
valued logics in the sense of (2)? It is shown that this is impossible for undecidable
calculi C, and possible for all decidable logics closed under substitution. This
leads us to the investigation of the many-valued closure MC(C) of C, i.e., the
set of formulas which are true in all covers of C. In other words, if some formula
can be shown to be underivable in C by a Bernays-style many-valued argument,
it is not in the many-valued closure. Using this concept we can classify calculi
according to their many-valued behaviour, or according to how good they can be
dealt with by many-valued methods. In the best case MC(C) equals the theorems
of C (This can be the case only if C is decidable). We give a sufficient condition
for this being the case. Otherwise MC(C) is a proper superset of the theorems
of C.
Axiomatizations C and C′ of the same logic may have different many-valued
closures MC(C) and MC(C′) while being model-theoretically indistinguishable.
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Hence, the many-valued closure can be used to distinguish between C and C′
with regard to their proof-theoretic properties.
Finally, we investigate some of these questions for other representations of
logics, namely for decision procedures and (effectively enumerated) finite Kripke
models. In these cases approximating sequences of many-valued logics whose
intersection equals the given logics can always be given.
Some of our results were previously reported in [4], of which this paper is a
substantially revised and expanded version.
2 Propositional Logics
Definition 2. A propositional language L consists of the following:
1. propositional variables: X1, X2, X3, . . .
2. propositional connectives of arity nj: 
n1
1 , 
n2
2 , . . . , 
nr
r . If nj = 0, then j
is called a propositional constant.
3. Auxiliary symbols: (, ), and , (comma).
Formulas and subformulas are defined as usual. We denote the set of formulas
over a language L by Frm(L). By Var(A) we mean the set of propositional
variables occurring in A. A substitution σ is a mapping of variables to formulas,
and if F is a formula, Fσ is the result of simultaneously replacing each variable
X in F by σ(X).
Definition 3. The depth dp(A) of a formula A is defined as follows: dp(A) = 0
if A is a variable or a 0-place connective (constant). If A = (A1, . . . , An), then
let dp(A) = max{dp(A1), . . . , dp(An)}+ 1.
Definition 4. A propositional Hilbert-type calculus C in the language L is given
by
1. a finite set A(C) ⊆ Frm(L) of axioms.
2. a finite set R(C) of rules of the form
A1 . . . An
C
r
where C, A1, . . . , An ∈ Frm(L)
A formula F is a theorem of L if there is a derivation of F in C, i.e., a finite
sequence
F1, F2, . . . , Fs = F
of formulas s.t. for each Fi there is a substitution σ so that either
1. Fi = Aσ where A is an axiom in A(C), or
2. there are Fk1 , . . . , Fkn with kj < i and a rule r ∈ R(C) with premises A1,
. . . , An and conclusion C, s.t. Fkj = Ajσ and Fi = Cσ
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If F is a theorem of C we write C ⊢ F . The set of theorems of C is denoted
by Thm(C).
Remark 5. The above notion of a propositional rule is the one usually used
in axiomatizations of propositional logic. It is, however, by no means the only
possible notion. For instance, Schu¨tte’s rules
A(⊤) A(⊥)
A(X)
C ↔ D
A(C)↔ A(D)
where X is a propositional variable, and A, C, and D are formulas, does not
fit under the above definition. And not only do they not fit this definition, the
proof-theoretic behaviour of such rules is indeed significantly different from other
“ordinary” rules. For instance, the rule on the left allows the derivation of all
tautologies with n variables in number of steps linear in n; with a Hilbert-type
calculus falling under the definition, this is not possible [3].
Remark 6. Many logics are more naturally axiomatized using sequent calculi, in
which structure (sequences of formulas, sequent arrows) are used in addition to
formulas. Many sequent calculi can easily be encoded in Hilbert-type calculi in
an extended language, or even straightforwardly translated into Hilbert calculi
in the same language, using constructions sketched below:
1. Sequences of formulas can be coded using a binary operator ·. The sequent
arrow can simply be coded as a binary operator →. For empty sequences, a
constant Λ is used. We have the following rules, to assure associativity of ·:
X ·
((
U · (V ·W )
)
· Y
)
→ Z
X ·
((
(U · V ) ·W
)
· Y
)
→ Z
(
X ·
(
U · (V ·W )
))
· Y → Z(
X ·
(
(U · V ) ·W
))
· Y → Z
as well as the respective rules without X , without Y , without both X and Y ,
with the rules upside-down, and also for the right side of the sequent (20 rules
total).
2. The usual sequent rules can be coded using the above constructions, e.g.,
the ∧-Right rule of LJ would become:
U → V ·X U → V · Y
U → V · (X ∧ Y )
3. If the language of the logic in question contains constants and connectives
which “behave like” the Λ and · on the left or right of a sequent, and a condi-
tional which behaves like the sequent arrow, then no additional connectives
are necessary. For instance, instead of ·, Λ on the left, use ∧, ⊤; on the right,
use ∨, ⊥, and use ⊃ instead of →. Addition of the rule
⊤ ⊃ X
X
would then result in a calculus which proves exactly the formulas F for which
the sequent → F is provable in the original sequent calculus.
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4. Some sequent rules require restrictions on the form of the side formulas in a
rule, e.g., the -right rule in modal logics:
Π → A
Π → A
It is not immediately possible to accommodate such a rule in the translation.
However, in some cases it can be replaced with another rule which can. E.g.,
in S4, it can be replaced by
Π → A
Π → A
which can in turn be accommodated using rules such as
X ⊃ Y
X ⊃ Y
U ∧(X ∧ Y ) ⊃ V
U ∧ (X ∧Y ) ⊃ V
U ∧Y ⊃ V
U ∧Y ⊃ V
(in the version with standard connectives serving as · and sequent arrow).
Definition 7. A propositional Hilbert-type calculus is called strictly analytic iff
for every rule
A1 . . . An
C
r
it holds that Var(Ai) ⊆ Var(C) and dp(Aiσ) ≤ dp(Cσ) for every substitution σ.
This notion of strict analyticity is orthogonal to the one employed in the con-
text of sequent calculi, where “analytic” is usually taken to mean that the rules
have the subformula property (the formulas in the premises are subformulas of
those in the conclusion). A strictly analytic calculus in our sense need not sat-
isfy this. On the other hand, Hilbert calculi resulting from sequent calculi using
the coding above need not be strictly analytic in our sense, even if the sequent
calculus has the subformula property. For instance, the contraction rule does
not satisfy the condition on the depth of substitution instances of the premises
and conclusion. The standard notion of analyticity does not entail decidability,
since for instance cut-free propositional linear logic LL is analytic but LL is
undecidable [14]. Our notion of strict analyticity does entail decidability, since
the depth of the conclusion of a rule in a proof is always greater or equal to the
depth of the premises, and so the number of formulas that can appear in a proof
of a given formula is finite.
Definition 8. A propositional logic L in the language L is a subset of Frm(L)
closed under substitution.
Every propositional calculusC defines a propositional logic, namely Thm(C),
since Thm(C) is closed under substitution. Not every propositional logic, how-
ever, is axiomatizable, let alone finitely axiomatizable by a Hilbert calculus. For
instance, the logic
{k(⊤) | k is the Go¨del number of a
true sentence of arithmetic}
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is not axiomatizable, whereas the logic
{k(⊤) | k is prime}
is certainly axiomatizable (it is even decidable), but not by a Hilbert calculus
using only  and ⊤. (It is easily seen that any Hilbert calculus for  and ⊤ has
either only a finite number of theorems or yields arithmetic progressions of ’s.)
Definition 9. A propositional finite-valued logic M is given by a finite set of
truth values V (M), the set of designated truth values V +(M) ⊆ V (M), and a
set of truth functions ˜j : V (M)
nj → V (M) for all connectives j ∈ L with
arity nj.
Definition 10. A valuation v is a mapping from the set of propositional vari-
ables into V (M). A valuation v can be extended in the standard way to a function
from formulas to truth values. v satisfies a formula F , in symbols: v |=M F , if
v(F ) ∈ V +(M). In that case, v is called a model of F , otherwise a countermodel.
A formula F is a tautology of M iff it is satisfied by every valuation. Then we
write M |= F . We denote the set of tautologies of M by Taut(M).
Example 11. The sequence of m-valued Go¨del logics Gm is given by V (Gm) =
{0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}, the designated values V +(Gm) = {0}, and the following truth
functions:
¬˜Gm(v) =
{
0 for v = m− 1
m− 1 for v 6= m− 1
∨˜Gm(v, w) = min(a, b)
∧˜Gm(v, w) = max(a, b)
⊃˜Gm(v, w) =
{
0 for v ≥ w
w for v < w
In the remaining sections, we will concentrate on the relations between propo-
sitional logics L represented in some way (e.g., by a calculus), and finite-valued
logics M. The objective is to find many-valued logics M, or effectively enumer-
ated sequences thereof, which, in a sense, approximate the the logic L.
The following well-known product construction is useful for characterizing
the “intersection” of many-valued logics.
Definition 12. Let M and M′ be m and m′-valued logics, respectively. Then
M×M′ is the mm′-valued logic where V (M×M′) = V (M)×V (M′), V +(M×
M′) = V +(M)×V +(M′), and truth functions are defined component-wise. I.e.,
if  is an n-ary connective, then
˜M×M′(w1, . . . , wn) = 〈˜M(w1, . . . , wn), ˜M′(w1, . . . , wn)〉.
For convenience, we define the following: Let v and v′ be valuations of M
andM′, respectively. v×v′ is the valuation ofM×M′ defined by: (v×v′)(X) =
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〈v(X), v′(X)〉. If v× is a valuation of M ×M′, then the valuations π1v× and
π2v
× ofM andM′, respectively, are defined by π1v
×(X) = v and π2v
×(X) = v′
iff v×(X) = 〈v, v′〉.
Lemma 13. Taut(M×M′) = Taut(M) ∩ Taut(M′)
Proof. Let A be a tautology of M ×M′ and v and v′ be valuations of M and
M′, respectively. Since v× v′ |=M×M′ A, we have v |=M A and v′ |=M′ A by the
definition of ×. Conversely, let A be a tautology of both M and M′, and let v×
be a valuation of M×M′. Since π1v× |=M A and π2v× |=M′ A, it follows that
v× |=M×M′ A. ⊓⊔
The definition and lemma are easily generalized to the case of finite products∏
iMi by induction.
The construction of Lindenbaum [15, Satz 3] shows that every propositional
logic can be characterized as the set of tautologies of an infinite-valued logic.
M(L) is defined as follows: the set of truth values V (M(L)) = Frm(L), and the
set of designated values V +(M(L)) = L. The truth functions are given by
˜(F1, . . . , Fn) = (F1, . . . , Fn)
Since we are interested in finite-valued logics, the following constructions will be
useful.
Definition 14. Let Frmi,j(L) be the set of formulas of depth ≤ i containing
only the variables X1, . . . , Xj . The finite-valued logic Mi,j(L) is defined as
follows: The set of truth values ofMi,j(L) is V = Frmi,j(L)∪{⊤}; the designated
values V + = (Frmi,j(L) ∩ L) ∪ {⊤}. The truth tables for Mi,j(L) are given by:
˜(v1, . . . , vn) =
=

(F1, . . . , Fn) if vj = Fj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
and (F1, . . . , Fn) ∈ Frmi,j(L)
⊤ otherwise
Proposition 15. Let v be a valuation inMi,j(L). If v(X) /∈ Frmi,j(L) for some
X ∈ Var(A), then v(A) = ⊤. Otherwise, v can also be seen as a substitution σv
assigning the formula v(X) ∈ Frmi,j(L) to the variable X. Then v(A) = A if
dp(Aσv) ≤ i and = ⊤ otherwise.
If A ∈ Frmi,j(L), then A ∈ Taut(Mi,j(L)) iff A ∈ L; otherwise A ∈
Taut(Mi,j(L)). In particular, L ⊆ Taut(Mi,j(L)).
Proof. By induction on the depth of A. ⊓⊔
When looking for a logic with as small a number of truth values as possible
which falsifies a given formula we can use the following construction.
Proposition 16. Let M be any many-valued logic, and A1, . . . , An be formulas
not valid in M. Then there is a finite-valued logic M′ = Φ(M, A1, . . . , An) s.t.
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1. A1, . . . , An are not valid in M
′,
2. Taut(M) ⊆ Taut(M′), and
3. |V (M′)| ≤ ξ(A1, . . . , An), where ξ(A1, . . . , An) =
∏n
i=1 ξ(Ai) and ξ(Ai) is
the number of subformulas of Ai + 1.
Proof. We first prove the proposition for n = 1. Let v be the valuation in M
making A1 false, and let B1, . . . , Br (ξ(A1) = r + 1) be all subformulas of A1.
Every Bi has a truth value ti in v. LetM
′ be as follows: V (M′) = {t1, . . . , tr,⊤},
V +(M′) = V +(M) ∩ V (M′) ∪ {⊤}. If  ∈ L, define ˜ by
˜(v1, . . . , vn) =

ti if Bi ≡ (Bj1 , . . . , Bjn)
and v1 = tj1 , . . . , vn = tjn
⊤ otherwise
(1) Since tr was undesignated in M, it is also undesignated in M
′. But v is
also a truth value assignment in M′, hence M′ 6|= A1.
(2) Let C be a tautology of M, and let w be a valuation in M′. If no sub-
formula of C evaluates to ⊤ under w, then w is also a valuation in M, and C
takes the same truth value in M′ as in M w.r.t. w, which is designated also in
M′. Otherwise, C evaluates to ⊤, which is designated inM′. So C is a tautology
in M′.
(3) Obvious.
For n > 1, the proposition follows by taking Φ(M, A1, . . . , An) =
∏n
i=1 Φ(M, Ai)
⊓⊔
3 Many-Valued Covers for Propositional Calculi
A very natural way of representing logics is via calculi. In the context of our
study, one important question is under what conditions it is possible to find,
given a calculusC, a finite-valued logicM which approximates as well as possible
the set of theorems Thm(C). In the optimal case, of course, we would like to
have Taut(M) = Thm(C). This is, however,not always possible. In fact, it is
in general not even possible to decide, given a calculus C and a finite-valued
logic M, if M is sound for C. In some circumstances, however, general results
can be obtained. We begin with some definitions.
Definition 17. A calculus C is weakly sound for an m-valued logicM provided
Thm(C) ⊆ Taut(M).
Definition 18. A calculus C is t-sound for an m-valued logic M if
(∗) All axioms A ∈ A(C) are tautologies of M, and for every rule r ∈ R(C)
and substitution σ: if for every premise A of r, Aσ is a tautology, then the
corresponding instance Cσ of the conclusion of r is a tautology as well.
Definition 19. A calculus C is strongly sound for an m-valued logic M if
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(∗∗) All axioms A ∈ A(C) are tautologies of M, and for every rule r ∈ R(C): if
a valuation satisfies the premises of r, it also satisfies the conclusion.
M is then called a cover for C.
We would like to stress the distinction between these three notions of sound-
ness. soundness. The notion of weak soundness is the familiar property of a
calculus to produce only valid formulas (in this case: tautologies of M) as the-
orems. This “plain” soundness is what we actually would like to investigate in
terms of approximations. More precisely, when looking for a finite-valued logic
that approximates a given calculus, we are content if we find a logic for which
C is weakly sound. This is unfortunately not possible in general.
Proposition 20. It is undecidable if a calculus C is weakly sound for a given
m-valued logic M.
Proof. Let C be an undecidable propositional calculus, let F be a formula, and
let C and, for each Xi ∈ Var(F ), Ci be new propositional constants (0-ary
connective) not occurring in C. Let σ : Xi 7→ Ci be a substitution. Clearly,
C ⊢ F iff C ⊢ Fσ. Now let C′ be C with the additional rule
Fσ
C
and let M be an m-valued logic which assigns a non-designated value to C and
otherwise interprets every connective as a constant function with a designated
value. Then every formula except a variable of the original language is a tautol-
ogy, and C is not. M is then weakly sound for C over the original language, but
weakly sound for C′ iff C is not derivable. Moreover, C′ ⊢ C iff C′ ⊢ Fσ, i.e., iff
C ⊢ F . If it were decidable whetherM is weakly sound for C′ it would then also
be decidable if C ⊢ F , contrary to the assumption that C is undecidable. ⊓⊔
On the other hand, it is obviously decidable if C is strongly sound for a given
matrix M.
Proposition 21. It is decidable if a given propositional calculus is strongly
sound for a given m-valued logic.
Proof. (∗∗) can be tested by the usual truth-table method. ⊓⊔
It is also decidable if C is t-sound for a matrix M, although this is less
obvious:
Proposition 22. It is decidable if a given propositional calculus is t-sound for
a given m-valued logic M.
Proof. Let r be a rule with premises A1, . . . , An and conclusion C containing the
variables X1, . . . , Xk, and σ a substitution. If A1σ, . . . , Anσ are tautologies, but
C is not, then (∗) is violated and r is not weakly sound. Given σ, this is clearly
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decidable. We have to show that there are only a finite number of substitutions
σ which we have to test.
Let Y1, . . . , Yl be the variables occurring in X1σ, . . . ,Xkσ. We show first that
it suffices to consider σ with l = m. For if v is a valuation in which Cσ is false,
then at most m of Y1, . . . , Yl have different truth values. Let τ be a substitution
so that τ(Yi) = Yj where j is the least index such that v(Yj) = v(Yi). Then (1)
v(Cστ) = v(Cσ) and hence Cστ is not a tautology; (2) Aiστ is still a tautology;
(3) there are at most m distinct variables occurring in A1στ , . . . , Anστ , Cστ .
Now every Bi = Xiσ defines anm-valued function ofm arguments. There are
mm
m
such functions. Whether Aiσ is a tautology only depends on the function
defined by Bi, but it is not prima facie clear which functions can be expressed
in M. Nevertheless, we can give a bound on the depth of formulas Bi that have
to be considered. Suppose σ is a substitution of the required form with Bi = Xiσ
of minimal depth and suppose that the depth of Bi is greater than m
′ = mm
m
.
Now consider a sequence of formulas C1, . . . , Cm′+1 with C1 = Bi and each
Cj a subformula of Cj−1. Each Cj also expresses an m-valued function of m
arguments. Since there are only m′ different such functions, there are j < j′
so that Cj and Cj′ define the same function. The formula obtained from Bi by
replacing Cj by Cj′ expresses the same function. Since this can be done for every
sequence of Cj ’s of length > m
′ we eventually obtain a formula which expresses
the same function as Bi but of depth ≤ m′, contrary to the assumption that it
was of minimal depth. ⊓⊔
Now, if C is strongly sound for M, it is also t-sound; and if it is t-sound, it
is also weakly sound. The converses, however, are false:
Example 23. Let L be the language consisting of a unary connective  and a
binary connective ⊳, and let C be the calculus consisting of the sole axiom
X ⊳ X and the rules
X ⊳ Y Y ⊳ Z
X ⊳ Z
r1
X ⊳ X
Y
r2
It is easy to see that the only derivable formulas in C using only rule r1 are
substitution instances of ℓX ⊳ kX with ℓ < k. In particular, no substitution
instance of the premise of r2,X ⊳ X , is derivable. It follows that rule r2 can never
be applied. We now show that if C is strongly sound for an m-valued matrixM,
Taut(M) = Frm(L), i.e., M is trivial. Suppose M is given by the set of truth
values V = {1, . . . ,m}. Since X ⊳ X must be a tautology, ⊳˜(i, ˜(i)) ∈ V +
for i = 1, . . . , m. Since C is strongly sound for rule r1, and by induction,
⊳˜(i, ˜k(i)) ∈ V + for all k. Since V is finite, there are i and k such that i = ˜k(i).
Then ⊳˜(i, i) ∈ V +. Since C is strongly sound for r2, we have V = V +. However,
C is weakly sound for non-trivial matrices, e.g., M′ with V ′ = {1, . . . , k}, V + =
{k}, ˜(i) = i+ 1 for i < k and = k otherwise, and ⊳˜(i, j) = k if i < j or j = k
and = 1 otherwise. C is, however, also not t-sound for this matrix.
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Example 24. Consider the calculus with propositional constants T , F , and bi-
nary connective 6=, the axiom T 6= F and the rules
Y 6= X
X 6= Y
r1
X 6= T X 6= F
Y
r2
and the matrix with V = {0, 1, 2}, V + = {2}, T˜ = 2, F˜ = 0, and ˜6=(i, j) = 2
if i 6= j and = 0 otherwise. Clearly, the only derivable formulas are T 6= F and
F 6= T , which are also tautologies. The calculus is not strongly sound, since
for v(X) = 1, v(Y ) = 0 the premises of r2 are designated, but the conclusion
is not. It is, however, t-sound: only a substitution σ with v(Xσ) = 1 for all
valuations v would turn both premises of r2 into tautologies, and there can be
no such formulas. Hence, we have an example of a calculus t-sound but not
strongly sound for a matrix.
Example 25. The IPC is strongly sound for the m-valued Go¨del logics Gm. For
instance, take axiom a5: B ⊃ (A ⊃ B). This is a tautology in Gm, for assume we
assign some truth values a and b to A and B, respectively. We have two cases: If
a ≤ b, then (A ⊃ B) takes the value m−1. Whatever b is, it certainly is ≤ m−1,
hence B ⊃ A ⊃ B takes the designated value m − 1. Otherwise, A ⊃ B takes
the value b, and again (since b ≤ b), B ⊃ A ⊃ B takes the value m− 1.
Modus ponens passes the test: Assume A and A ⊃ B both take the value
m− 1. This means that a ≤ b. But a = m− 1, hence b = m− 1.
Now consider the following extension G⊤m of Gm: V (G
⊤
m) = V (Gm) ∪ {⊤},
V +(G⊤m) = {m− 1,⊤}, and the truth functions are given by:
˜G⊤m(v¯) =
{
⊤ if ⊤ ∈ v¯
˜Gm(v¯) otherwise
for  ∈ {¬,⊃,∧,∨}. IPC is not strongly sound for G⊤m, since a valuation with
v(X) = ⊤, v(Y ) = 0 would satisfy the premises of rule MP, X and X ⊃ Y ,
but not the conclusion Y . However, a calculus in which the conclusion of each
rule contains all variables occurring in the premises, is strongly sound (such as
a calculus obtained from LJ using the construction outlined in Remark 6).
Example 26. Consider the following calculus K:
X ↔˜©X
X ↔˜Y
X ↔˜©Y
r1
X ↔˜X
Y
r2
It is easy to see that the corresponding logic consists of all instances of X ↔˜©kX
where k ≥ 1. This calculus is only strongly sound for the m-valued logic having
all formulas as its tautologies. But if we leave out r2, we can give a sequence of
many-valued logicsMi, for each of whichK is strongly sound: Take for V (Mn) =
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{0, . . . , n− 1}, V +(Mn) = {0}, with the following truth functions:
©˜v =
{
v + 1 if v < n− 1
n− 1 otherwise
v˜˜↔w = {0 if v < w or v = n− 1
1 otherwise
Obviously, Mn is a cover for K. On the other hand, Taut(Mn) 6= Frm(L), e.g.,
any formula of the form ©(A) takes a (non-designated) value > 0 (for n > 1).
In fact, every formula of the form ©kX ↔˜X is falsified in some Mn.
4 Optimal Covers
By Proposition 21 it is decidable if a given m-valued logic M is a cover of C.
Since we can enumerate all m-valued logics, we can also find all covers of C.
Moreover, comparing two many-valued logics as to their sets of tautologies is
decidable, as the next theorem will show. Using this result, we see that we can
always generate optimal covers for C.
Definition 27. For two many-valued logics M1 and M2, we write M1 E M2
iff Taut(M1) ⊆ Taut(M2).
M1 is better than M2, M1 ⊳M2, iff M1 EM2 and Taut(M1) 6= Taut(M2).
Theorem 28. Let two logics M1 and M2, m1-valued and m2-valued respec-
tively, be given. It is decidable whether M1 ⊳M2.
Proof. It suffices to show the decidability of the following property: There is a
formula A, s.t. (*) M2 |= A but M1 6|= A. If this is the case, write M1 ⊳
∗ M2.
M1 ⊳M2 iff M1 ⊳
∗ M2 and not M2 ⊳
∗ M1.
We show this by giving an upper bound on the depth of a minimal for-
mula A satisfying the above property. Since the set of formulas of L is enumer-
able, bounded search will produce such a formula iff it exists. Note that the
property (*) is decidable by enumerating all assignments. In the following, let
m = max(m1,m2).
Let A be a formula that satisfies (*), i.e., there is a valuation v s.t. v 6|=M1
A. W.l.o.g. we can assume that A contains at most m different variables: if it
contained more, some of them must be evaluated to the same truth value in the
counterexample v for M1 6|= A. Unifying these variables leaves (*) intact.
Let B = {B1, B2, . . .} be the set of all subformulas of A. Every formula Bj
defines an m-valued truth function f(Bj) of m variables where the values of the
variables which actually occur in Bj determine the value of f(Bj) via the matrix
of M2. On the other hand, every Bj evaluates to a single truth value t(Bj) in
the countermodel v.
Consider the formula A′ constructed from A as follows: Let Bi be a subfor-
mula of A and Bj be a proper subformula of Bi (and hence, a proper subformula
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of A). If f(Bi) = f(Bj) and t(Bi) = t(Bj), replace Bi in A with Bj . A
′ is shorter
than A, and it still satisfies (*). By iterating this construction until no two sub-
formulas have the desired property we obtain a formula A∗. This procedure
terminates, since A′ is shorter than A; it preserves (*), since A′ remains a tau-
tology under M2 (we replace subformulas behaving in exactly the same way
under all valuations) and the countermodel v is also a countermodel for A′.
The depth of A∗ is bounded above by mm
m+1 − 1. This is seen as follows: If
the depth of A∗ is d, then there is a sequence A∗ = B′0, B
′
1, . . . , B
′
d of subformulas
of A∗ where B′k is an immediate subformula of B
′
k−1. Every such B
′
k defines a
truth function f(B′k) ofm variables inM2 and a truth valued t(B
′
k) inM1 via v.
There are mm
m
m-ary truth functions of m truth values. The number of distinct
truth function-truth value pairs then is mm
m+1. If d ≥ mm
m+1, then two of the
B′k, say B
′
i and B
′
j where B
′
j is a subformula of B
′
i define the same truth function
and the same truth value. But then B′i could be replaced by B
′
j , contradicting
the way A∗ is defined. ⊓⊔
Corollary 29. It is decidable if two many-valued logics define the same set of
tautologies. The relation E is decidable.
Proof. Taut(M1) = Taut(M2) iff neither M1 ⊳
∗ M2 nor M2 ⊳
∗ M1. ⊓⊔
Let ≃ be the equivalence relation on m-valued logics defined by: M1 ≃
M2 iff Taut(M1) = Taut(M2), and let MVLm be the set of all m-valued log-
ics over Lwith truth value set {1, . . . ,m}. By Mm we denote the set of all
sets Taut(M) of tautologies of m-valued logics M. The partial order 〈Mm,⊆〉
is isomorphic to 〈MVLm/ ≃,E / ≃〉.
Proposition 30. The optimal (i.e., minimal under ⊳) m-valued covers of C
are computable.
Proof. Consider the set Cm(C) of m-valued covers of C. Since Cm(C) is finite
and partially ordered by E, Cm(C) contains minimal elements. The relation E
is decidable, hence the minimal covers can be computed. ⊓⊔
Example 31. By Example 25, IPC is strongly sound for G3. The best 3-valued
approximation of IPC is the 3-valued Go¨del logic. In fact, it is the only 3-valued
approximation of any sound calculus C (containing modus ponens) for IPL
which has less tautologies than classical logic CL. This can be seen as follows:
Consider the fragment containing ⊥ and ⊃ (¬B is usually defined as B ⊃ ⊥).
LetM be some 3-valued strongly sound approximation of C. By Go¨del’s double-
negation translation, B is a classical tautology iff ¬¬B is true intuitionistically.
Hence, whenever M |= ¬¬X ⊃ X , then Taut(M) ⊇ CL. Let 0 denote the value
of ⊥ in M, and let 1 ∈ V +(M). We distinguish cases:
1. 0 ∈ V +(M): Then Taut(M) = Frm(L), since⊥ ⊃ X is true intuitionistically,
and by modus ponens: ⊥,⊥ ⊃ X/X .
2. 0 /∈ V +(M): Let u be the third truth value.
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(a) u ∈ V +(M): Consider A ≡ ((X ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ X . If v(X) is u or 1, then,
since everything implies something true, A is true (Note that we have
Y, Y ⊃ (X ⊃ Y ) ⊢ X ⊃ Y ). If v(X) = 0, then (since 0 ⊃ 0 is true, but
u ⊃ 0 and 1 ⊃ 0 are both false), A is true as well. So Taut(M) ⊇ CL.
(b) u /∈ V +(M), i.e., V +(M) = {1}: Consider the truth table for implication.
Since B ⊃ B, ⊥ ⊃ B, and something true is implied by everything, the
upper right triangle is 1. We have the following table:
⊃ 0 u 1
0 1 1 1
u v1 1 1
1 v0 v2 1
Clearly, v0 cannot be 1. If v0 = u, we have, by ((X ⊃ X) ⊃ ⊥) ⊃ Y ,
that v1 = 1. In this case, M |= A and hence Taut(M) ⊇ CL. So assume
v0 = 0.
i. v1 = 1: M |= A (Note that only the case of ((u ⊃ 0) ⊃ 0) ⊃ u has to
be checked).
ii. v1 = u: M |= A.
iii. v1 = 0: With v2 = 0, M would be incorrect (u ⊃ (1 ⊃ u) is false). If
v2 = 1, again M |= A. The case of v2 = u is the Go¨del logic, where
A is not a tautology.
Note that it is in general impossible to effectively construct a E-minimal
m-valued logic M with L ⊆ Taut(M) if L is given independently of a calculus,
because, e.g., it is undecidable whether L is empty or not: e.g., take
L =
{
{k(⊤)} if k is the least solution of D(x) = 0
∅ otherwise
where D(x) = 0 is the Diophantine representation of some undecidable set.
5 Effective Sequential Approximations
In the previous section we have shown that it is always possible to obtain the
best m-valued covers of a given calculus, but there is no way to tell how good
these covers are. In this section, we investigate the relation between sequences of
many-valued logics and the set of theorems of a calculus C. Such sequences are
called sequential approximations of C if they verify all theorems and refute all
non-theorems of C, and effective sequential approximations if they are effectively
enumerable. This is also a question about the limitations of Bernays’s method.
On the negative side, an immediate result says that calculi for undecidable logics
do not have effective sequential approximations. If, however, a propositional logic
is decidable, it also has an effective sequential approximation (independent of
a calculus). Moreover, any calculus has a uniquely defined many-valued closure,
whether it is decidable or not. This is the set of all sentences which cannot be
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proved underivable using a Bernays-style many-valued argument. If a calculus
has an effective sequential approximation, then the set of its theorems equals
its many-valued closure. If it does not, then its closure is a proper superset.
Different calculi for one and the same logic may have different many-valued
closures according to their degree of analyticity.
Definition 32. Let L be a propositional logic and let A = 〈M1,M2,M3, . . . , 〉
be a sequence of many-valued logics s.t. (1) Mi EMj iff i ≥ j.
A is called a sequential approximation of L iff L =
⋂
j∈ω Taut(Mj). If in
addition A is effectively enumerated, then A is an effective sequential approxi-
mation.
If L is given by the calculus C, and each Mj is a cover of C, then A is a
strong (effective) sequential approximation of C (if A is effectively enumerated).
We say C is effectively approximable, if there is such a strong effective se-
quential approximation of C.
Condition (1) above is technically not necessary. Approximating sequences
of logics in the literature (see next example), however, satisfy this condition.
Furthermore, with the emphasis on “approximation,” it seems more natural that
the sequence gets successively “better.”
Example 33. Consider the sequenceG = 〈Gi〉i≥2 of Go¨del logics and intuitionis-
tic propositional logic IPC. Taut(Gi) ⊃ Thm(IPC), sinceGi is a cover for IPC.
Furthermore, Gi+1 ⊳ Gi. This has been pointed out by [10], for a detailed proof
see [11, Theorem 10.1.2]. It is, however, not a sequential approximation of IPC:
The formula (A ⊃ B)∨(B ⊃ A), while not a theorem of IPL, is a tautology of all
Gi. In fact,
⋂
j≥2 Taut(Gi) is the set of tautologies of the infinite-valued Go¨del
logicGℵ, which is axiomatized by the rules of IPC plus the above formula. This
has been shown in [8] (see also [11, Section 10.1]). Hence, G is a strong effective
sequential approximation of Gℵ = IPC+ (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A).
Jas´kowski [13] gave an effective strong sequential approximation of IPC.
That IPC is approximable is also a consequence of Theorem 48, with the proof
adapted to Kripke semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic, since IPL has
the finite model property [9, Ch. 4, Theorem 4(a)].
The natural question to ask is: Which logics have (effective) sequential ap-
proximations; which calculi are approximable?
First of all, any propositional logic has a sequential approximation, although
it need not have an effective approximation.
Proposition 34. Every propositional logic L has a sequential approximation.
Proof. A sequential approximation of L a is given by Mi =Mi,i(L) (see Defini-
tion 14). Any formula F /∈ L is in V (Mk) for k = max{dp(F ), j} where j is the
maximum index of variables occurring in F . By Proposition 15, F is falsified in
Mk. Also, Taut(Mi) ⊇ L, and Mi EMi+1. ⊓⊔
Corollary 35. If L is decidable, it has an effective sequential approximation.
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Proof. Using a decision procedure for L, we can effectively enumerate theMi,i(L).
⊓⊔
Proposition 36. If L has an effectively sequential approximation, then Frm(L)\
L is effectively enumerable.
Proof. Suppose there is an effectively enumerated sequence A = 〈M1,M2, . . .〉
s.t.
⋂
j≥2 Taut(Mj) = L. If F /∈ L then there would be an index i s.t. F is false
in Mi. But this would yield a semi-decision procedure for non-members of L:
Try for each j whether F is false in Mj . If F /∈ L, this will be established at
j = i. ⊓⊔
Corollary 37. If C is undecidable, then it is not effectively approximable.
Proof. Thm(C) is effectively enumerable. If C were approximable, it would have
an effective sequential approximation, and this contradicts the assumption that
the non-theorems of C are not effectively enumerable. ⊓⊔
Example 38. This shows that a result similar to that for IPC cannot be obtained
for full propositional linear logic.
If C is not effectively approximable (e.g., if it is undecidable), then the in-
tersection of all covers for C is a proper superset of Thm(C). This intersection
has interesting properties.
Definition 39. The many-valued closure MC(C) of a calculus C is the set of
formulas which are true in every many-valued cover for C.
Proposition 40. MC(C) is unique and has an effective sequential approxima-
tion.
Proof. MC(C) is unique, since it obviously equals
⋂
M∈S Taut(M) where S is
the set of all covers for C. It is also effectively approximable, an approximating
sequence is given by
M1 =M
′
1
Mi =Mi−1 ×M
′
i
where M′i is an effective enumeration of S. ⊓⊔
Since MC(C) is defined via the many-valued logics for which C is strongly
sound, it need not be the case that MC(C) = Thm(C) even if C is decidable.
(An example is given below.) On the other hand, it also need not be trivial (i.e.,
equal to Frm(L)) even for undecidable C. For instance, take the Hilbert-style
calculus for linear logic given in [1,19], and the 2-valued logic which interprets the
linear connectives classically and the exponentials as the identity. All axioms are
then tautologies and the rules (modus ponens, adjunction) are strongly sound,
but the matrix is clearly non-trivial.
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Corollary 41. If C is strictly analytic, then MC(C) = Thm(C).
Proof. We have to show that for every F /∈ Thm(C) there is a finite-valued
logic M which is strongly sound for C and where F /∈ Taut(M). Let X1, . . . ,
Xj be all the variables occurring in F and the axioms and rules of C. Then set
M =Mdp(F ),j(Thm(C)).
By Proposition 15, F /∈ Taut(M) and all axioms of C are in Taut(M). Now
consider a valuation v in M and suppose v(Ai) ∈ V + for all premises Ai of a
rule of C. We have two cases: if v(X) = ⊤ for some variable X appearing in a
premise Ai, then, since C is strictly analytic, X also appears in the conclusion C
and hence v(C) = ⊤. Otherwise, let σv be the substitution corresponding to v.
If v(Ai) = ⊤ for some i, this means that dp(Aiσ) > dp(F ). By strict analyticity,
dp(Cσ) ≥ dp(Aiσ) > dp(F ) and hence v(C) = ⊤. Otherwise, v(Ai) = Aiσ for
all premises Ai. Since v(Ai) is designated, Aiσ ∈ Thm(C), hence Cσ ∈ Thm(C).
Then either v(C) = Cσ or v(C) = ⊤, and both are in V +. ⊓⊔
Example 42. The last corollary can be used to uniformly obtain semantics for
strictly analytic Hilbert calculi. Strict analyticity of the calculus is a necessary
condition, as Example 23 shows. The calculus given there is decidable, though
not strictly analytic, and has only trivial covers. Its set of theorems nevertheless
has an effective sequential approximation, i.e., it is the intersection of an infinite
sequence of finite-valued matrices which are weakly sound for C. For this it is
sufficient to give, for each formula A s.t. C 0 A, a matrix M weakly sound for
C with A /∈ Taut(M). Let the depth of A be k, and let
V0 = Var(A) ∪ {†}
Vi+1 = Vi ∪ {B ⊳ C | B,C ∈ Vi} ∪ {B | B ∈ Vi}
Then set V = Vk, V
+ = {B ⊳ C | B ⊳ C ∈ V,C ≡ lB} ∪ {†}. The truth
functions are defined as follows:
˜(B) =
{
† if B ∈ Vk but B /∈ Vk−1, or B = †
B otherwise
⊳˜(B,C) =

† if C ∈ Vk but C /∈ Vk−1, or B = †
† ⊳ C else if B ∈ Vk but B /∈ Vk−1
B ⊳ C otherwise
The axiom X ⊳ X is a tautology. For if v(X) = †, then v(X) = † and
hence v(X ⊳ X) = † ∈ V +. If v(X) ∈ Vk but /∈ Vk−1, then v(X) = † and
v(X ⊳ X) = †. Otherwise v(X) = B for B = v(A) and v(X ⊳ X) = † (if
B ∈ Vk) or = B ⊳ B ∈ V +.
If v(X) = †, then v(X ⊳ Z) = †. Otherwise v(X ⊳ Z) ∈ V + only if v(X) = B
and v(Y ) = lB and B /∈ Vk. Then, in order for v(Y ⊳ Z) to be ∈ V +, either
v(Y ⊳ Z) = †, in which case v(Z) ∈ Vk but /∈ Vk−1, and hence v(Y ⊳ Z) = †,
or v(Y ⊳ Z) = lB ⊳ l
′
B with l < l′, in which case v(Y ⊳ Z) = B ⊳ l
′
B.
18
However, A /∈ Taut(M). For it is easy to see by induction that in the valua-
tion with v(X) = X for all variables X ∈ Var(A), v(B) = B as long as B ∈ Vk
and so v(A) can only be designated if A ≡ B ⊳ B for some B, but all such
formulas are derivable in C.
However, there are substitution instances of X ⊳ X , viz., for any σ with Xσ
of depth > k, for which (X ⊳ X)σ is a tautology. Even though C is weakly
sound for M, it is not t-sound.
So far we have concentrated on approximations of logics given via calculi.
However, propositional logics are also often defined via their semantics. The most
important example of such logics are modal logics, where logics can be character-
ized using families of Kripke structures. If these Kripke structures satisfy certain
properties, they also yield sequential approximations of the corresponding log-
ics. Unsurprisingly, for this it is necessary that the modal logics have the finite
model property, i.e., they can be characterized by a family of finite Kripke struc-
tures. The sequential approximations obtained by our method are only effective,
however, if the Kripke structures are effectively enumerable.
Definition 43. A modal logic L has as its language L the usual propositional
connectives plus two unary modal operators:  (necessary) and ♦ (possible). A
Kripke model for L is a triple 〈W,R, P 〉, where
1. W is any set: the set of worlds,
2. R ⊆W 2 is a binary relation on W : the accessibility relation,
3. P is a mapping from the propositional variables to subsets of W .
A modal logic L is characterized by a class of Kripke models for L.
This is called the standard semantics for modal logics (see [7, Ch. 3]). The
semantics of formulas in standard models is defined as follows:
Definition 44. Let L be a modal logic, KL be its characterizing class of Kripke
models. Let K = 〈W,R, P 〉 ∈ KL be a Kripke model and A be a modal formula.
If α ∈ W is a possible world, then we say A is true in α, α |=L A, iff the
following holds:
1. A is a variable: α ∈ P (X)
2. A ≡ ¬B: not α |=L B
3. A ≡ B ∧ C: α |=L B and α |=L C
4. A ≡ B ∨ C: α |=L B or α |=L C
5. A ≡ B: for all β ∈ W s.t. α R β it holds that β |=L B
6. A ≡ ♦B: there is a β ∈W s.t. α R β and β |=L B
We say A is true in K, K |=L A, iff for all α ∈W we have α |=L A. A is valid in
L, L |= A, iff A is true in every Kripke model K ∈ KL. By Taut(L) we denote
the set of all formulas valid in L.
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Many of the modal logics in the literature have the finite model property
(fmp): for every A s.t. L 6|= A, there is a finite Kripke model K = 〈W,R, P 〉 ∈ K
(i.e., W is finite), s.t. K 6|=L A (where L is characterized by K). We would like
to exploit the fmp to construct sequential approximations. This can be done as
follows:
Definition 45. Let K = 〈W,R, P 〉 be a finite Kripke model. We define the
many-valued logic MK as follows:
1. V (MK) = {0, 1}W , the set of 0-1-sequences with indices from W .
2. V +(MK) = {1}W , the singleton of the sequence constantly equal to 1.
3. ¬˜MK , ∨˜MK , ∧˜MK , ⊃˜MK are defined componentwise from the classical truth
functions
4. ˜MK is defined as follows:
˜MK (〈wα〉α∈W )β =
{
1 if for all γ s.t. β R γ, wγ = 1
0 otherwise
5. ♦˜MK is defined as follows:
♦˜MK (〈wα〉α∈W )β =
{
1 if there is a γ s.t. β R γ and wγ = 1
0 otherwise
Furthermore, vK is the valuation defined by vK(X)α = 1 iff α ∈ P (X) and = 0
otherwise.
Lemma 46. Let L and K be as in Definition 45. Then the following hold:
1. Every valid formula of L is a tautology of MK.
2. If K 6|=L A then vK 6|=MK A.
Proof. Let B be a modal formula, and K ′ = 〈W,R, P ′〉. We prove by induction
that vK′(B)α = 1 iff α |=L B:
B is a variable: P ′(B) =W iff vK(B)α = 1 for all α ∈W by definition of vK .
B ≡ ¬C: By the definition of ¬˜MK , vK(B)α = 1 iff vK(C)α = 0. By induction
hypothesis, this is the case iff α 6|=L C. This in turn is equivalent to α |=K B.
Similarly if B is of the form C ∧D, C ∨D, and C ⊃ D.
B ≡ C: vK(B)α = 1 iff for all β with α R β we have vK(C)β = 1. By
induction hypothesis this is equivalent to β |=L C. But by the definition of 
this obtains iff α |=L B. Similarly for ♦.
(1) Every valuation v ofMK defines a function Pv via Pv(X) = {α | v(X)α =
1}. Obviously, v = vPv . If L |= B, then 〈W,R, Pv〉 |=L B. By the preceding
argument then v(B)α = 1 for all α ∈ W . Hence, B takes the designated value
under every valuation.
(2) Suppose A is not true in K. This is the case only if there is a world α at
which it is not true. Consequently, vK(A)α = 0 and A takes a non-designated
truth value under vK . ⊓⊔
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The above method can be used to construct many-valued logics from Kripke
structures for not only modal logics, but also for intuitionistic logic. Kripke
semantics for IPL are defined analogously, with the exception that α |= A ⊃ B
iff β |= A ⊃ B for all β ∈ W s.t. α R β. IPL is then characterized by the class
of all finite trees [9, Ch. 4, Thm. 4(a)]. Note, however, that for intuitionistic
Kripke semantics the form of the assignments P is restricted: If w1 ∈ P (X)
and w1 R w2 then also w2 ∈ P (X) [9, Ch. 4, Def. 8]. Hence, the set of truth
values has to be restricted in a similar way. Usually, satisfaction for intuitionistic
Kripke semantics is defined by satisfaction in the initial world. This means that
every sequence where the first entry equals 1 should be designated. By the above
restriction, the only such sequence is the constant 1-sequence.
Example 47. The Kripke tree with three worlds
w2 w3
տ ր
w1
yields a five-valued logic T3, with V (T3) = {000, 001, 010, 011, 111}, V +(T3) =
{111}, the truth table for implication
⊃ 000 001 010 011 111
000 111 111 111 111 111
001 010 111 010 111 111
010 001 001 111 111 111
011 000 001 010 111 111
111 000 001 010 011 111
⊥ is the constant 000, ¬A is defined by A ⊃ ⊥, and ∨ and ∧ are given by the
componentwise classical operations.
The Kripke chain with four worlds corresponds directly to the five-valued
Go¨del logic G5. It is well know that (X ⊃ Y ) ∨ (Y ⊃ X) is a tautology in all
Gm. Since T3 falsifies this formula (take 001 for X and 010 for Y ), we know
that G5 is not the best five-valued approximation of IPL.
Furthermore, let
O5 =
∧
1≤i<j≤5
(Xi ⊃ Xj) ∨ (Xj ⊃ Xi) and
F5 =
∨
1≤i<j≤5
(Xi ⊃ Xj).
O5 assures that the truth values assumed by X1, . . . , X5 are linearly ordered
by implication. Since neither 010 ⊃ 001 nor 001 ⊃ 010 is true, we see that there
are only four truth values which can be assigned to X1, . . . , X5 making O5 true.
Consequently, O5 ⊃ F5 is valid in T3. On the other hand, F5 is false in G5.
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Theorem 48. Let L be a modal logic characterized by a set of finite Kripke mod-
els K = {K1,K2, . . .}. A sequential approximation of L is given by 〈M1,M2, . . .〉
where M1 =MK1 , and Mi+1 =Mi×MKi+1 . This approximation is effective if
K is effectively enumerable.
Proof. (1) Taut(Mi) ⊇ Taut(L): By induction on i: For i = 1 this is Lemma 46 (1).
For i > 1 the statement follows from Lemma 13, since Taut(Mi−1) ⊇ Taut(L)
by induction hypothesis, and Taut(MKi) ⊇ Taut(L) again by Lemma 46 (1).
(2) Mi EMi+1 from A ∩B ⊆ A and Lemma 13.
(3) Taut(L) =
⋂
i≥1Taut(Mi). The⊆-direction follows immediately from (1).
Furthermore, by Lemma 46 (2), no non-tautology of L can be a member of all
Taut(Mi), whence ⊇ holds. ⊓⊔
Remark 49. Finitely axiomatizable modal logics with the fmp always have an ef-
fective sequential approximation, since it is then decidable if a given finite Kripke
structure satisfies the axioms. Urquhart [20] has shown that this is not true if
the assumption is weakened to recursive axiomatizability, by giving an example
of an undecidable recursively axiomatizable modal logic with the fmp. Since this
logic cannot have an effective sequential approximation, its characterizing fam-
ily of finite Kripke models is not effectively enumerable. The preceding theorem
thus also shows that the many-valued closure of a calculus for a modal logic
with the fmp equals the logic itself, provided that the calculus contains modus
ponens and necessitation as the only rules. (All standard axiomatizations are of
this form.)
6 Conclusion
Our brief discussion unfortunate must leave many interesting questions open,
and suggests further questions which might be topics for future research. The
main open problem is of course whether the approach used here can be extended
to the case of first-order logic. There are two distinct questions: The first is how
to check if a given finite-valued matrix is a cover for a first-order calculus. Is
this decidable? One might expect that it is at least for “standard” formulations
of first-order rules, e.g., where the rules involving quantifiers are monadic in
the sense that they only involve one variable per rule. The second question is
whether the relationship ⊳∗ is decidable for n-valued first order logics. Another
problem, especially in view of possible applications in computer science, is the
complexity of the computation of optimal covers. One would expect that it is
tractable at least for some reasonable classes of calculi which are syntactically
characterizable.
We have shown that for strictly analytic calculi, the many-valued closure
coincides with the set of theorems, i.e., that they are effectively approximable
by their finite-valued covers. Is it possible to extend this result to a wider class
of calculi, in particular, what can be said about calculi in which modus ponens
is the only rule of inference (so-called Frege systems)? For calculi which are not
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effectively approximable, it would still be interesting to characterize the many-
valued closure. For instance, we have seen that the many-valued closure of linear
logic is not equal to linear logic (since linear logic is undecidable) but also not
trivial (since all classical non-tautologies are falsified in a 2-valued cover). What
is the many-valued closure of linear logic? For those (classes of) logics for which
we have shown that sequential approximations are possible, our methods of proof
also do not yield optimal solutions. For instance, for modal logics with the finite
model property we have shown that all non-valid formulas can be falsified in the
many-value logic obtained by coding the corresponding Kripke countermodel.
But there may be logics with fewer truth-values which also falsify these formu-
las. A related question is to what extent our results on approximability still hold
if we restrict attention to many-valued logics in which only one truth-value is
designated. The standard examples of sequences of finite-valued logics approxi-
mating, e.g.,  Lukasiewicz or intuitionistic logic are of this form, but it need not
be the case that every approximable logic can be approximated by logics with
only one designated value.
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